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Ethiopia: An Alternative Approach to National Development 
 
Daniel Kendie 
 
  
Abstract:                                  
The existing Ethiopian constitution that is based on ethnicity should be discarded and 
replaced by another constitution that recognizes territorial nationalism, which 
manifested itself in historic Ethiopia as regionalism or provincialism.  The historically 
established status of the provinces of Arussie, Bale, Gondar, Harar, Shoa, Sidamo, 
Tigrai, Wollo, Wollega, and so on, would have to be restored.  A federal constitution 
which corresponds to Ethiopia’s historical experiences, but modified to suit its present 
conditions, and based on such principles as the rule of law, state secularism, a bill of 
rights, a system of checks an balances, political and economic pluralism, including the 
legalization of political parties that are organized on the basis not of ethnicity, but on 
political philosophies and ideologies, should be presented to the Ethiopian people.  An 
Ethiopian state organized in such a manner would be stable. It would also be in a much 
better position to conquer poverty, to solve its problems with Eritrea, its former 
province, and to intensify development cooperation with all of its neighbours in order to 
help speed up sub- regional economic integration. 
 
Why an alternative approach to national development? What is wrong with the existing 
system? Why should the present constitution be discarded? Since Eritrea was an 
Ethiopian Province, how did it become independent? These and similar other questions 
will have to be addressed first before proposing what measures should be taken to 
ameliorate the situation. For this reason, a brief account of the country’s history needs 
to be provided.  
Language Groups and National Unity 
 
Given its geographic location, physical size, population composition, and resource 
endowments, Ethiopia could have played a crucial role in the economic transformation 
and integration of the countries of the Horn of Africa.  However, its relative 
underdevelopment and the tenuous nature of its national unity have kept such a 
possibility out of its reach.  At the root of its underdevelopment, which is itself the root 
cause of civil conflicts, is the lack of an enlightened and informed leadership which 
could have taken timely and decisive measures to address the country’s developmental 
problems and guide its transition from one stage of development into another. Conflicts 
over power and resources are driven principally by economic interests and are sustained 
by them. The uneven distribution of resources and of infrastructure, as well as 
environmental degradation and widespread poverty, creates propitious ground for 
violence.  Given state repression and politically motivated sociology, including the 
policy of divide and rule, economics is overlaid on ethnicity, and economic problems 
pass for ethnic conflicts. 
 
The people of Ethiopia have more in common that unites them than is commonly 
understood.  They have had centuries of experience of a common history and culture, 
which they enjoyed within a shared geographic space.  Besides, the concept of kinship 
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and ethnicity has little meaning as a guide to the grouping of peoples in the country.  
Rather, one has to talk of peoples using a language and culture of Hamitic, Semitic, or 
Cushitic origin, or sometimes of a mixture of cultures.1  Almost all scholars now agree 
that for at least 3,000 years and probably longer, Semitic, Cushitic, and Hamitic 
languages, all of which are related, have been spoken in the highlands of Ethiopia.2 
 
The country’s population of 53 million is diverse in geographic, religious and linguistic 
terms.  According to the national census, the Oromos and Amharas account for 32.15%   
 
               Population of Ethiopia by Ethnic Groups: 
 
Ethnic Group  Size of Population  % of Eth. Pop. 
 
Afar    979,367   1.84% 
Agaw    555,722   1.05% 
(Awingi & Kamyr) 
Amhara         16,007,933            30.13%   
Ari    155,002    0.29% 
Bench    173,125    0.33% 
Gedeo    639,905    1.20% 
Gumuz   121,487    0.23% 
Gurage           2,290,274    4.31% 
Hadiya    927,933    1.75% 
Jebelawi   118,530    0.22% 
Kaffacho   599,188    1.13% 
Kemant   172,327    0.32% 
Kembatta   499,825    0.94% 
Kembatta   125,900    0.24% 
Alaba 
Konso    153,419    0.29% 
Koyra    107,595    0.20% 
Oromo          17,080,318             32.15%   
Sidama           1,842,314    3.47% 
Somale           3,160,540    5.95% 
Tigreans            3,284,568    6.18% 
Wolaita           1,269,216               2.39% 
Gamo             719,847                          1.36% 
Goffa               241,530                          0.46% 
Kulo/Dawro              331,483               0.62% 
Yemsa    165,184                          0.31% 
Other Groups                      1,413,318                  2.66% 
Foreigners   105,000               0.20% 
Not Stated                             5,827               0.01% 
                                                 
1
 Spencer Trimingham (1952). Islam in Ethiopia, (London: New York, Oxford University Press), P.5 
2
 Donald L. Donham (1985), Work and Power in Maale, Ethiopia (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press) p. 31. 
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Total  (80)         53,132,276                100 % 
 
Source: CSA (1994) 
and 30.13% of the population respectively. Others include the Tigreans (6.18%) and the 
Somalis (5.95%). The remaining groups represent only 25.59% of the country’s 
population. While 60% of Ethiopians are Christian, 40% are Muslim.3  It should also be 
noted that there are more speakers of Amharic, probably some 75%, than those who 
ethnically would be considered Amharas.   
 
The Ethiopian state grew organically out of history by cultural, political, military, 
administrative and economic processes.  Indeed, a study of the political history of 
Ethiopia also shows that there has been very little antagonism between the various 
language groups.  In the majority of times, the problem has been between the rulers and 
the ruled irrespective of the ethnic origin of the rulers. 4  Donald Levine, a widely 
recognized scholar of the Horn of Africa, maintains that Ethiopia with its political, 
religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, should be considered a single cultural region 
for the following reasons:  For the last two millennia at least, the peoples of Ethiopia 
have been in more or less constant interaction through trade, warfare, religious activities, 
migration, intermarriage, and exchange of special services, and that integration into a 
single polyethnic imperial system was brought about through the efforts of the 
Axumites, and later the Amharas, so that stability and unity in diversity find ready 
expression in Greater Ethiopia.  He acknowledges what the Tigrean contribution has 
been to Ethiopia’s unity, how the Tigreans maintained continued loyalty to the Ethiopian 
state, and how the Oromos who live throughout the country, revitalized the state, and 
provided the necessary social cement as well as the leadership, to connect the diverse 
peoples of Ethiopia.5  Having examined what trait the three major language groups, i.e., 
the Amharas, Oromos, and Tigreans share in common, Levine concludes that by virtue 
of sharing similar cultural traditions and a common national heritage, the Ethiopians 
managed to survive the forces of internal disintegration and remain the only part of 
Africa not colonized by the Europeans.  More recently, he noted that the peoples of 
Ethiopia are more similar and historically more connected than the different nationalities 
that composed the Soviet Union, that the evidence of their deep affinities is simply 
overwhelming, that Ethiopians outside the northern highlands need to have their 
traditions respected and their deprivations acknowledged, but the sense in which they 
belong to a common cultural area needs to be appreciated.6 
 
The German ethnographer, Eike Haberland, also emphasizes that as a result of 
migrations, interactions, conquests, trade, intermarriage, and so on, the diverse peoples 
of Ethiopia have created a single geographic and cultural unit7  Markakis too confirms 
                                                 
3
 The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Addis Ababa. 
4
.Solomon Terfa (March –April 1997)  “Frustration –Aggression or What?” Ethiopia Review 
5
.Donald Levine (1974) Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, (Chicago & London:  
   The University of Chicago Press), PP.92 – 112. 
6.
 Donald Levine (August 1992) “Greater Ethiopia Reconsidered”, Ethiopia Review. 
7
. Eike Haberland  (1963) Galla-Sud-Athiopians (Stuttgart:Kohlammer for Forbanins Institute). 
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that since the traditional Ethiopian conception of ethnic identity centres on religion, 
social distance in the south, as in the north, is primarily determined by religious 
differences.  Where religion is not a factor, ethnic differences pose no great barrier to 
contact and even to integration.  Markakis further contends that considerable integration 
has been achieved between Amharas and the other Ethiopians living in Shoa, Wollega, 
and Illubabor Provinces.  Intermarriage here, he says, is not uncommon, even for 
members of the royal family.8 But he could have also included Wollo, Gondar, Gojjam, 
Harar, and the other provinces, where integration has been going on for centuries.  
Loyalty for Oromos, for example, like for most Amharas, has been more regional and 
territorial, than ethnic. This is so because regional identification has had the first claim 
on people’s loyalties.   Every Gurage, Oromo, or Amhara who lives for example in 
Wollo would say “ine ye wollo liji negne”, I am a citizen of Wollo. Every Oromo or 
Amhara who lives in Harar would say the same- I am a citizen of Harar. That is how the 
primary identification of Ethiopians has been formed.  
 
Lipsky also affirms that there has been a great deal of intermarriage between Amharas 
and Gallas/Oromos.  In Shoa province, for instance, he says, by the 1920s, observers 
reported great difficulty in telling the difference between Amharas and Gallas, and that 
the process of amalgamation has continued since then9. In fact, there is no region or 
province that can be said to be pure,10 except perhaps the Ogaden and the Afar region. 
 
If Robert Hess, Levine and others describe Ethiopia as a country that has preserved its 
nationhood and independence for more than 2,000 years,11 and as an ingathering of 
peoples with deep historical affinities,12 on the other hand, there is, for instance, Herbert 
Lewis, who claims that the Ethiopian Empire was formed during the period that the 
British and French Empires were, and with many of the same means: through a series of 
conquests, some of them quite brutal13 Merara Gudina, too, claims that much of the land 
that is inhabited by Oromos was incorporated into Ethiopia only during the reign of the 
Emperor Menelik.14 Such misconceptions and distorted historical interpretations that   
are devoid of genuine scholarship have been repeated with deadening regularity. Before 
correcting the misconceptions, we must review the country’s history, even if briefly. 
 
Brief History 
Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries of the world. Its ancient and modern history has 
been the history of the survival of a people who maintained their identity through 
stubborn conquest and reconquest of their neighbours or invaders, absorbing the better 
part of their culture, and producing a culture which could be called their own.  Ethiopia 
                                                 
8John Markakis (1974) Ethiopia: Anatomy of A Traditional Polity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press)  
   P. 135-136 
9
. George Lipsky (1962) Ethiopia, its People, its Society, its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press) 
      pp.30-35.  
10
 . See “Ethiopia: the Federal Sham”, The Economist, August 16, 1997. 
11
 Robert Hess (1970), Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (London: Cornell University Press),  
    pp. 30-50. 
12.Levine, Greater Ethiopia, P.26  
13.
 Herbert Lewis in Crawford Young’s The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? 
14
  See Tobia  (Amharic Weekly) Addis Ababa, number 7, Megabit 1987=March 1995. 
  
5 
has been described as an “ethnic museum”.15  But, the idea of Ethiopia is also bigger, 
larger and deeper than the sum total of its contradictions.   
 
A Semitic language called Geez or Ethiopic, (still in use as the liturgical language of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church), served as the official language of the first Ethiopian state 
of Axum, which flourished from 5 B.C. till 8 A.D.16 With the decline of Axum, there 
arose a significant upheaval and migration of populations.  Some stayed in the north, and 
others moved south.  Those who stayed in the north developed Tigre and Tigriagna 
languages from Geez.  Similarly, those who moved south developed Amharic and 
Guragegna languages from Geez.   Civil disorders and the absence of even minimum 
standards of security are certain to have prevented social intercourse remote from one’s 
home and thus to have created regionally water-tight compartments17 
 
Even if Geez had held a position in Ethiopia, which is similar to that of Latin in Europe 
in the Middle Ages, by the 13th century it was definitely transformed into Tigre and 
Tigrigna in the north, and Amharic and Guragegna in the south.  Tigre and Tigrigna are 
as mutually unintelligible as Spanish and Italian.  But if Geez is compared to Latin, then 
Tigre, which is spoken in present-day northern and western Eritrea, takes the place of 
Spanish, and Tigrigna – the language spoken in central Eritrea and Tigrai, can assume 
the role of Italian, and Amharic, the national language of the country, can take the place 
of French. At a basic level, the bifurcation of the people into Tigreans and Amharas has 
not altered the overlap of values, consciousness of historical relationship, religious 
affiliation, and social organization.  They stand relatively united in facing the pressure of 
other intermingling and surrounding people.18  They take great pride in their history, 
deriving political and social unity from their historic role in the creation of such centres 
of civilization as Axum, Adulis, Yeha, Lalibela, and Gondar, and that though often 
rivals in the past for political supremacy, they have always maintained awareness of 
their common religion and descent from common Semitic forebears.19 
 
With the decline of Axum, however, power shifted to the south, and with it began a 
southern expansion.  The Ethiopian Kingdoms of Lalibella (1137-1270), of Shoa (1300-
1600), and Gondar (1632-1885), became militant exponents of Axum’s culture. Amde 
Tsion (1314-1344), Negus Yeshaque (1414-1429), Zere Yacob (1434-1468), and Serse 
Dingil (1563-1597), could be described as the leaders who laid down the foundations of 
the Medieval Ethiopian state.20  In their days, Ethiopia was well provided with iron, and 
its soldiers were armed in much the same fashion as European early medieval soldiers. 
The country also impressed travelers by the people’s skill in the arts and architecture and 
                                                 
15
.Conti – Rossini (1928), Storia d’Ethiopia, Milan, Chapter 1. 
16For the history of Axum, see J. Kobishchankov (1979) Axum (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State 
University Press); see also Munro – Hay (1991) Aksum: An African Civilization of Late Antiquity 
(Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press). 
17
. Edward Ullendorff (1955) The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia (London:Taylor”s Press), p.8  
18
 Lipsky, Ethiopia: its Peoples… P.35. 
19IBID, Lipsky, P.35. 
20See G.W.B. Huntingford Oxford: (1965) The Glorious Victories of Amde Seyon. See also J. Perruchon         
    (translator), Les Chroniques de Zar ‘a Ya’ eqob et de Ba eda Maryam, (Paris: 1893). For Serse Dingil  
    see C.F. Bechingham and G.W.B Huntingford Some Records of Ethiopia (London: 1954). 
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by the piety and learning of its churchmen.21 It was also a vast country. In the north, it 
extended as far as Massawa and the Barka lowlands overlooking the Sudan plains.  The 
southern provinces included the former kingdoms of Ifat, Fatajar, Dawaro, and Bali.   
Negus Yeshaque, for instance, who conquered the port of Zeila in 1415, also conquered 
the rich and fertile southwestern provinces including Kembata, Welamo, Sidamo and 
Kefa.22  In a series of brilliant military campaigns, Serse Dingil, in turn, put an end to 
Harar as a military power, and to OttomanTurkish expansion in the Red Sea coast of 
Ethiopia, except for the Port of Massawa, where the Ottoman Turkish presence was 
heavily fortified.23 Likewise, the foundations of the modern Ethiopian state were laid 
down by the Emperors Tewodors II (1855-1868), Yohannes IV (1872-1889), Menelik II 
(1889-1913), and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974). 
 
That the Emperor Menelik 24 “conquered” –  re-incorporated would be more appropriate, 
the southern and eastern provinces of today’s Ethiopia is a fact.  However, a selective 
interpretation of the country’s history that is provided by such individuals as Herbert 
Lewis and Merara Gudina conveniently overlooks another fact, i.e. that these provinces 
were part and parcel of Ethiopia before the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, and before the 
Muslim plunder and destruction of the country led by Ahmed-ibn-Ibrahim or Gragne 
(1527- 1548),25 and before the Oromo migration from the Bale province of southern 
Ethiopia, to central, western, eastern and northern Ethiopia.26 
Herbert Lewis himself admits that the Oromos are to be found everywhere stretching 
from the Tigrai Province of Northern Ethiopia to Kenya and from the Sudan border to 
the Somalia border, and recognizes that they occupy much of the best fertile land in the 
country.27  But how was the land acquired? Wherever Oromos went, they raided and 
burned down settlements. In fact, as early as 1555,the Governor of Bale, Hamelmal, 
fought and resisted their expansion. Serse Dingil, who had built the churches of St 
George in Jimma and that of St Mary in Damot, in what is now called Wollega, defeated 
                                                 
21
 Lewis H. Gann etc. Africa and the World (2000) Lanham. New York. Oxford: University Press of 
America) p. 243. 
22
.Levine, Greater Ethiopia. Pp.73-76. 
 
23
.Trimigham, Islam in Ethiopia, PP.70 – 79. See also Stephen Longrigg (1945), A Short History of Eritrea 
    (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), P 86. 
24
 
.See Harold Marcus (1975) The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1849 – 1913 (Oxford: The  
    Clarendon Press). 
25
 Trimingham describes the Muslim plunder of Ethiopia in these words: “The conquest was devastating in  
     its destruction, irresistible in its ferocity, and appalling in its cruelties,” see Islam in Ethiopia, PP. 76 –
89. For an eye-witness account see Shihab Ad-Din in Futuh-al-Habasha (1559).  It is slightly biased in 
favour of Muslims.  It has been translated to French by Rene Basset as  Etudes Sur L’ Histoire 
d’Ethiopie   (Paris: 1882). 
26
. For the origin of the Oromos and their expansion throughout Ethiopia, see BAHREY, History of the 
Galla (a) in E.A.W. Budge, A History of Ethiopia, 2 vols. (London:1928) (b)  in C.A. Beckingham and 
G.W.B. Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593-1646 ( London, 1954), See also Herbert Lewis, 
“The Origin of the Galla and Somali, Journal of African History, VII, I (1966) PP27-46. According to 
him, the Galla/Oromo migration began in about 1530. 
27
 .Herbert Lewis, “Ethiopia Beginning Again”, (Sept. – Oct. 1991) African Report, Vol. 36. No. 5, 
    PP.59-62. 
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them in Zewai in 1570.28The uprooting and displacement of non-Oromos during the 
course of Oromo migration and expansion in past centuries, which was fiercely resisted, 
and which is amply documented, seems to be overlooked. In the process, old Geez or 
Amharic names were replaced by Oromo names. For example, “Melza” became Wollo; 
“Mekane Selassie” changed to Woreilu;  “Damot” became Wollega; and “Inarya” 
changed to Illubabor.  While liberals condemn some of  Menelik’s re-incorporation 
policy, some of which was brutal, right-wing nationalists would say that what Menelik 
and the other leaders of 19th century Ethiopia did was to recover land that belonged to 
Ethiopia in the first place, and may even add that the application of the principle of self-
determination for Oromos cannot be different from the way other Ethiopians should 
exercise it.  
 
By taking advantage of the exhaustion of the country that fought a fifteen-year defensive 
war against Ottoman supported Gragne, and driven by population explosion and by the 
cycle of the gada system, Oromos plundered Ethiopia. The Amharas, Tigreans, Agews, 
and Gurages in turn plundered the Oromos. So what? Getting into a debate as to who 
was the villain and who was the victim is a dead end.  It would take the discussion 
nowhere.  It must not be forgotten that war, conquest, enslavement, destruction, pillage, 
and massacre, make up all too much of the wretched chronicle of human history.  
Besides, which conqueror in history ever cared for the welfare and dignity of the 
vanquished? Ethiopian history cannot be an exception.  Why should the present 
generation of Ethiopians be responsible for what happened four hundred or even one 
hundred years ago? There is no such thing as guilt by birth or by association.  Bloodshed 
and destruction is to no one’s interest.  The challenge for Ethiopians is to establish a 
system where the people can live in peace and in circumstances of equality of 
opportunity, and where they care for one another.  There are enough sane and rational 
Afars, Amharas, Gurages, Oromos, Somalis, Tigreans, and so on, who can provide the 
necessary leadership. Certain regularities in human actions and certain laws in human 
behaviour have led to certain truths, which have now become universal: That there is a 
difference between what the individual wishes to become and what society permits 
him/her to be, and that gifted individuals come to the helm of leadership through the 
                                                 
28
  Tekle Tsadik Mekuria (1960) Ye Ethiopia Tarik Ke Atse Lebne Dingil Eske Atse Tewodros, (History 
of Ethiopia from Emperor Lebne Dingil to EmperorTewodros)  (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education, 
1968) p. 98.  
 
29
. W.Connor (1972),  “Nation-Building or Nation –Destroying, World Politics 24, 3 pp.319-355.  
30
. Tom Nairn (1977) The Break –up of Britain: Crisis and New-Nationalism, (London:NLB), PP.306-328. 
Ethnicity and nationalism can be identified as strong attachments for any group of people who set 
themselves apart from other groups with whom they interact in terms of some distinctive criteria such as 
language. When taken to the extreme, the norms and values of ones own culture becomes the basis for 
judging others. The more so when individuals are born and raised in a culture which is the only one 
accessible to them, they lack the exposure to other cultural perspectives. Such ethnocentrisms contribute to 
irrational prejudice and encourage hostility towards outsiders. Benedict Anderson (1991) Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: New York, Verso), argues 
that nationalism and nations are inventions either of rulers or intellectuals who cannot justify themselves 
without getting their history wrong. Both tendencies, he says are ideologically constructed from 
sometimes arbitrary assumptions and unverified facts and obvious falsehoods.  
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normal channel if society has ways of discovering them.  The challenge for all 
Ethiopians is therefore to devise such a system, which will permit the discovery of such 
individuals from whose integrity, modesty, intelligence, creativity, insight, and vision 
the country can benefit.  
 
Responsible leaders recognize that “knowledge” in most cases is an assortment of facts, 
assumptions, interpretations, and conclusions. So, they are careful to limit their claims to 
certainty. In fact, they make a conscious effort to minimize the temptation to snap 
judgment and over statement. As a result, they do not attempt to express opinions on 
matters they know little or nothing about. Before they express their views, they take the 
trouble to be sure that it is responsibly framed. When they face challenging problems, 
they weigh and consider all possible options. If they do something wrong, they refuse to 
compound the mistake by pretending that what they did was “wise.” When they hear a 
valid argument, they accept it – even if that means rejecting a cherished personal view. 
Greatness to such people comes from admitting their limits. They know that to be human 
is to be fallible. They also avoid stereotyping and selective perceptions.  
 
The Integrative Dilemma 
 
If the diverse people of Ethiopia have indeed succeeded in creating a single geographic 
and cultural unit, how is the present situation to be explained? Given the global reality, 
from the ethnic point of view, out of 185 states only 9.1% can be described as being 
homogenous 29 So what is wrong if Ethiopia is multi-ethnic? History demonstrates that 
“ethnicity” and “nationalism” has always been the preoccupation of the 
intelligentsia.30The intelligentsia provides the historical, philosophical, ethnographic and 
geographical basis of ethnicity and nationalism. If necessary, the re-interpretation and 
invention of history will be carried out in such a way so as to stress and recreate the 
putatively “distinctive” and unique cultural heritage of the ethnic group that they want to 
mobilize.  In the process, despite the available evidence, history will be rewritten to suit 
the purpose.  To that end, the intelligentsia of minority ethnic elites have fought to fix 
nation-state boundaries around themselves, or to obtain self-determination for 
themselves, only to deny it to others.31 If the intelligentsia feels alienated, it will not also 
hesitate to take power by other means, including ideological trickery for the creation of a 
secessionist state. Secession – a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of self-
determination - has frequently been used by the intelligentsia to exercise its right to self-
determination by breaking away either to join another state, or more often to establish an 
independent state of its own.32The world has yet to see an instance in which ethnic elites 
have established a new social order that does not duplicate the injustices of the old that 
they have displaced.33 “National independence” means for them very good jobs and the 
creation of a national unit whose frontiers are closed to outside talent - a magnificent job 
monopoly for them.34  If the truth has to be told, in a country like Ethiopia, it is not the 
                                                 
31
 .Daniel Moyniham (1993) Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford: New York, 
Oxford University Press), PP. 107 – 126. 
32
 . John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1994), Nationalism (Oxford: New York, Oxford Press), p. 273. 
33
. Ayenew Ashagre (April 1966) “The Ethnicization of the Ethiopian State”, The Ethiopian Review. 
34
 .ERNEST Gellner (1964) Thought and Change (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press), 
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peasants and workers of Eritrea, Tigrai, Wollo, or Wollega who brought all the social 
tension to the country. It is the so-called “educated” elite, whose “education” was 
supposed to have cultivated the innate goodness of man, but who have failed to live by 
what was expected of them. The great majority of the masses, especially the workers and 
peasants, are the last to be affected by ethnicity and nationalism.35  The integrative 
dilemma comes not from tribal animosities or masses in revolt, but from conflicts among 
and within the various elites. 36 These conflicts are products of competition between 
ethnic elites for state power in which state centralism encourages alienated elites to raise 
ethnic demands. 37  The Ethiopian student activists of the 1960s and 1970s who have 
influenced current trends in the country, may have been motivated by egalitarian 
considerations. However, the solution they provided to what was called “the question of 
nationalities”, has led to sawing the seeds of divisive sentiments in today’s Ethiopia.  
 
Forty years ago, for instance, Eritreans were not Eritreans, but Hamassien, Akele-
guazaie, or Seraie.  Thirty years ago, Oromos were not Oromos, but Mecha, Tulema, 
Arussie, or Borana.  Likewise, ten years ago, Amharas were not Amharas but Gondere, 
Gojame, Bulge, Sainte, or simply Wolloye.  Similarly, twenty years ago, Tigreans were 
not Tigreans, but Tembien, Agame, Enderta, or Shire.  By identifying with a sub-culture, 
and by using it as a power base, some members of the intelligentsia have therefore 
attempted to climb the political ladder because the system blocked their ascendance to 
power.  
 
In this regard, despite the historical, demographic, cultural and other factors which the 
people of Eritrea share with the rest of Ethiopia, there has been an attempt to re-write 
Eritrea’s history and in the process to distort it 38 That what is now called “Eritrea” was 
the cradle of Ethiopian civilization, culture and statehood cannot be disputed. No 
professional anthropologist or historian has argued otherwise. After its occupation by 
Italy for some fifty years, the victorious world powers established a fact-finding mission 
and dispatched it to the former Italian colony in order to ascertain the wishes of the 
people. Accordingly, the Eritrean people freely expressed themselves to the Four Power 
Commission of Investigation (1946-1947), 39and to the U.N. Commission on Eritrea 
(1950-1952).40   On both counts, the majority of the Eritrean people expressed their 
                                                                                                                                                
   PP.169-170.  
35
. Eric Hobsbawn (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) pp,5-13. 
36
. Donald Levine (1965) Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chicago:The 
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desire to re-unite with Ethiopia. Similarly, during the British supervised elections of 
1952, the Unionist Party - a party which did not campaign for federation or 
confederation, but for unconditional re-union with Ethiopia - won together with its allies 
47 out of 66 seats of the Eritrean Assembly 41 These are the facts.  But the conclusions 
made by several Eritrean writers in which they describe Ethiopia as a “colonialist” state, 
is, to say the least, highly speculative, without serious foundation in the available 
evidence. Such writers are politically motivated. They practice what is called “advocacy 
scholarship.” They pay little attention to the need for evidence. In fact, they often form 
their views first and then seek support for them later.   
 
The great majority of Oromos take great pride in their Ethiopian identity.  They have 
played and should continue to play distinguished roles in the peace and development of 
Ethiopia.  Some of the Ethiopian leaders like Iyoas, Tinishu Ras Ali, Leji Eyassu, the 
Emperor Haile Selassie, and the various other kings and queens who ruled Ethiopia from 
Ankober, Debre Birhan, Gondar or Yeju, had Oromo lineage.42 Despite this fact, some 
Oromo political activists recently wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, claiming among other things, that out of the 400,000 square miles of the 
land mass of Ethiopia, some 375,000 sq. miles belongs to Oromos (see map), that their 
land produces 65% of the Ethiopian government revenue, and that they have been 
“colonized” by Ethiopia.43 But the fact of the history is just as we discussed it earlier. 
The raids, the burning down of settlements, and the uprooting and displacement of the 
original inhabitants by Oromo expansion seems to have been totally overlooked. 
 
The Emperor Haile Selassie is to be credited for helping liberate Ethiopia from the yoke 
of Italian Fascism, for establishing the educational system of the country, and for 
bringing to an end the isolation of Ethiopia by making it a member of the League of 
Nations (1923), the United Nations (1945), the Non-Aligned Movement (1961), and for 
making Addis Ababa the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (1959), and the Organization of African Unity (1963).  But in social terms, 
Ethiopia experienced no substantial changes during Haile Selassie’s fifty years of 
autocratic rule. He did introduce western education and elements of western bureaucratic 
structure and military organization. However, the changes that he brought about had 
only a limited effect in the rural areas where most Ethiopians lived.  In fact, a United 
Nations study based on 1965 data showed that in education, Ethiopia’s ratio of primary 
school pupils to total population was only 1.68%.  Similarly, in health care, the ratio was 
                                                                                                                                                
41
. Pankhurst E.Sylvia, and Pankhurst, Richard (1953) Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Last Phase of the Reunion 
Struggle, 1941-1952 (Essex:Woodford Green) p.281   
42
 .Lej Eyassu’s father, Mohammed Ali was an Oromo chief from Wollo.  Having renounced Islam, he 
was baptized and given the name Mikael by the Emperor Yohannes. Subsequently, he became one of 
the key provincial governors.  He was married to Menelik’s daughter, Shewareged. Their son, Lej 
Eyassu succeeded Menelik.  Likewise, Haile Selassie’s Oromo lineage can be traced to his great 
grandfather, Guddessa. Haile Selassie had also Tigrean lineage through his father, Ras Makonnen.  See 
also H. Weld Blundell, The Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1769 – 1840 (Cambridge: 1922). 
43
 .The information was collected from the Internet. See www.oromo.org/org/osg/oromap2.htm. 
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0.34 hospital beds per 1,000 populations. Life expectancies at birth were 34 years in 
1960 and 38 years in 1975.44 
 
 
 
 
 
MAP OF OROMIA 
 
Source: http://www.oromo.org/osg/oromap2.htm 
 
Yet, the little that was done created a new set of challenges, which eventually overthrew 
both the Emperor and the old social structure, which he represented.  As Bottomore 
notes: The actions of the dynastic elites have made attempts to bring about social and 
economic changes from above, but their actions are seriously restricted by the interest 
which they have as a class in maintaining the existing state of society.  In order to carry 
out reform, they would have to permit and to encourage, much greater social mobility, to 
extend education rapidly, and to make their own elite positions more easily accessible to 
individuals and groups from the lower strata of society.  It is doubtful if they can do this 
or counter the influence of the new elites, which are competing with them for mass 
support.45 It is precisely because their elite positions were not made more easily 
                                                 
44
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World Bank, World Development Indicators, (World Bank, Washington D.C., 1978) Table 17. 
45
.Bottomore, T.B., Elites and Society (1964) Basic Book, Publishers: New York), P.90. 
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accessible that a destructive form of primordialism has gained currency in today’s 
Ethiopia.  To borrow the words of President Kennedy: “Those who make peaceful 
revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable.”   
 
Haile Selassie’s government was overthrown in 1974 and replaced by a leftist military 
junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The new regime established a tightly organized 
monopolistic party structure and refused to tolerate other social forces which advocated 
political pluralism.  Old patterns were systematically destroyed, traditional values and 
institutions were replaced with a new set of institutions, laws and standards largely 
copied from Eastern Europe, but in the main irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of 
the Ethiopian masses.  The post 1974 Ethiopian state simply copied a number of models 
from the USSR, and made it a law, as if it was an obligatory model for building 
socialism. Such institutions, which Ethiopia largely copied from the USSR, were 
characterized by a single command centre and by the absence of any mediating 
institutions between the citizen and the state.  In effect, the autocratic and absolutist 
monarchist state was overthrown, only to be replaced by another absolutist state.  
Tenant/landlord relationships were abolished, only to be replaced by a system in which 
the peasants became the tenants of the state.  Furthermore, the military regime banned 
political parties, independent trade unions, and the free press.  Since it called itself 
“socialist”, the major means of production, including rural land and urban houses, 
became state owned.  In such a set-up, whatever the ruling military officers did went to 
increase the extractive capacity of the state, and to diminish the productive capacity of 
the population.  The result was the establishment of a state whose abuse of power had no 
parallel or precedence in the country’s history.  Widespread arbitrary arrests, torture, 
summary executions, mass displacement, long-term detention without trail, and harsh 
prison conditions became the order of the day.46 
 
But to its credit, the military government also expanded elementary and secondary 
school education at unprecedented rates. The massive literacy programme in which it 
took the initiative, involving some seven million adults, or nearly half of the adult 
population, was awarded a UNESCO prize. The defeat and eviction of the invading 
armed forces of Somalia from Ethiopian territory that they had occupied in 1978, and 
that of the EPLF and its eventual confinement to the mountain stronghold of Nacfa 
(1978-1982), should also be recognized. Medical care and provision of water supplies to 
rural areas had also been dramatically improved.  The land reform programme too needs 
to be mentioned. There was some degree of urbanization and industrialization. Against 
this background, however, we need to note the fact that some 60 of the leading 
government officials, including the Emperor Haile Selassie, Prime Ministers Aklilou 
Habte Wold, and Endalkatchew Makonnen, as well as General Aman Mikael Andom 
were murdered by the regime. Some 40,000 educated Ethiopians were forced into exile.  
                                                 
46
 .For a historical approach to the study of the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, see Andargatchew Tiruneh 
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Ethiopian Revolution 1974 – 1991 from a Monarchical Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy (Kegan Paul 
International: London and New York).  See also Amnesty International Reports of 1977, 1978, 1980 
and 1989. 
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The death of some 5,000 – 10,000 youths supposed to have been involved in the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the disappearance of some 10,000 
to 40,000 people into political prisons, should also not be forgotten.47 
 
Since the regime lacked even a semblance of legitimacy, it wanted to solve all social, 
economic and political problems with the iron fist, which resulted in ever-mounting 
military expenditures.  In 1974, Ethiopia’s defense budget was U.S. $51 million.  By 
1988, it had reached a level of U.S. $724 million – a fourteen-fold increase. Debt 
servicing was $24.8 million in 1974.  However, by 1988 it had increased to $256 million 
– a ten fold increase-making it almost impossible for the country to accumulate capital.  
During the same period, agricultural production dropped by 16.3%.48 
 
For seventeen years, Ethiopians endured one of the most appalling and horrendous 
dictatorships ever.  The overthrow of that dictatorship by a protracted people’s struggle 
in May 1991 was hoped to bring the long awaited peace, democracy and reconciliation.49 
Indeed, it was also hoped that a genuinely democratic system of government would 
make law constitutional and institutional rather than personal. It was hoped that the 
future government would be based on the separation of powers, accountability, a bill of 
rights, state secularism, political and economic pluralism, and respect for human rights, 
and that, individuals and groups would be free to differ, and to organize themselves 
around differing ideas to enhance their legitimate individual and collective interests, that 
nationalized property including land and urban housing would be returned back to the 
original owners, and that political parties would be legalized to contest elections.  Many 
Ethiopians honestly believed that such a democratic system of government would also 
restore Eritrea’s federal status, and extend the same status to the other provinces of 
Ethiopia and make the country a genuine federal republic.  By means of such a political 
and administrative structure, it was also hoped that the country’s unity and territorial 
integrity would be maintained and development efforts intensified.   
  
The Unexpected Regime 
 
To the dismay of most Ethiopians, however, an unexpected regime, which is still busy 
tearing down the fabric that holds the country together, came to power. The organization 
which bases itself on ethnicity, and which calls itself the Tigrai People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF), which came to power in 1991, had its background in Marxism/Leninism 
in which the constitution of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigrai (MLLT) even made it 
a regulation that members submit written applications to be allowed to express new 
ideas.50 
 
The Historical Background 
                                                 
47.
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In 1972-1973, a group of Tigreans had created a clandestine association known as 
Mahber politika, or political association, which shortly came to be known as the Tigrai 
Liberation Front.  Its members were largely trained and armed by the Eritrean Liberation 
Front (ELF) 51 Shortly thereafter, well-known individuals within the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) became actively involved in organizing what was to become 
the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  The EPLF provided the necessary military 
training and the arms.  In fact, a well-known long time EPLF operative, Meharie Haile, 
otherwise known as Mussie Barake, became a member of the Central Committee of the 
TPLF, and its real military commander.  Subsequently, other EPLF functionaries 
infiltrated the organization, slowly, but surely. 52The involvement of both Eritrean 
movements in Tigrai was not by accident. For cultural and political reasons, the two 
Eritrean organizations were at loggerheads with one another. The political and military 
need for enlisting allies outside of Eritrea seems to have been uppermost. The urgency to 
split the Ethiopian army, to diffuse its area of military operations by engaging it in 
various regions, and to sap its energy, in so far as the two Eritrean organizations were 
battling it, were some of the motives.  Whether pressured or inspired by unbridled 
opportunism, the TPLF echoed the EPLF position and began to present the Eritrean 
conflict as a “colonial question”.  The 320-page book titled Kalsi Hzbi Ertra, Kabey 
Nabey, that Meles Zenawi wrote supporting Eritrean independence, would be enough to 
show the extent of the commitment of the TPLF to the EPLF.53 As if that was not 
enough, the TPLF also added that it was similarly fighting against “Ethiopian 
colonialism” in Tigrai, and therefore struggling for the establishment of the “Democratic 
Republic of Tigrai”.54 
 
Having liquidated the TLF with the assistance of the EPLF, the TPLF had now to 
compete with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), whose largely 
Tigrigna-speaking leadership pursued a non-ethnic revolutionary programme.  In the late 
1970s, with the support of the EPLF, the TPLF fought pitched battles against the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRP), and prevailed with its ethnically 
exclusive programme in Tigrai.55 It was also after defeating the EPRP, that the TPLF 
was now fully involved in cooperating with the EPLF to defeat the ELF and to 
marginalize it militarily in Eritrean politics.  That done, both organizations now 
mobilized their efforts and energies to battling the Ethiopian army.  This was 
demonstrated in Enda Selassie in Tigrai, on February 19,1987, when the EPLF forces 
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fully participated in the fight against the Ethiopian army. 56  Likewise, the TPLF fought 
in Eritrea in support of the EPLF, most notably in 1982, when many Tigreans perished 
in Nakfa. As an acute observer of the scene, Alem Abay, noted: 
 
The price the Tigreans paid for Eritrea remains unappreciated.   It would 
not be too difficult to imagine the course of the Eritrean revolution had 
the ELF not been pushed out of Eritrea.  When the EPLF was pinned 
down by Mengistu’s army in Nakfa, the Tigrean fighters arrived for its 
rescue twice.  During the “Red Star Campaign” of 1982, for instance, 
Tigreans fought in Nakfa on the Eritrean side, for nine months.  
Furthermore, without the supreme sacrifice of the Tigreans, the demand 
for Eritrean independence would have been little more than a bargaining 
chip for a negotiated settlement. 57 
 
How the TPLF came to Power 
Why did the Tigreans pay the supreme sacrifice for Eritrea’s independence? 
Some observers argue that judged by its record, the TPLF was commissioned by the 
EPLF to thwart the consolidation and emergence of a modern and unified Ethiopian state 
on the southern flank of the Red Sea.  The ambition of the EPLF leadership, they say, is 
to destroy Ethiopia, and to make Eritrea the successor state, and that the TPLF, and 
especially its Secretary General, Meles Zenawi, is nothing but a satellite lackey of the 
EPLF 58 It is the same TPLF, they say, that has declared war on Ethiopian nationalism, 
which refuses to acknowledge the reality of Ethiopia’s historic existence as a multi-
ethnic state, that has repudiated the symbolism of historic Ethiopia, and that has now 
taken power in the country.  Many Ethiopians seriously believe that its mission is to 
destroy the country from within.  And how did it come to power anyway?  
 
 The USA had been seeking a renewal of its ties with Ethiopia – a country that was once 
Washington’s most important client on the African continent, and despite its close 
relations with the Soviet Union, still considered the most attractive of all the countries of 
the region.  Among the reasons cited were the following: Ethiopia’s large population and 
economic potential, the historic nature of U.S.-Ethiopian ties, the ability of the Ethiopian 
bureaucracy to get the job done, a strategic location bordering the Red Sea, a Christian 
heritage that could serve as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalist movements, and 
Ethiopia’s role as host to the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 59  To that end, in an 
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effort to find a peaceful settlement to the civil war in Ethiopia, former President Jimmy 
Carter was involved as a mediator.  The then Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs in the Bush administration, Herman Cohen, too visited Addis Ababa in August 
1989.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Irvin Hicks; Robert C. 
Frasure, a member of the National Security Council; and former Senator Rudy 
Boschwitz were also in Addis Ababa in 1991 for the same purpose.  In the June 1989 
meeting between Herman Cohen and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly 
Adamishin, Ethiopia figured prominently.60  Meanwhile, thanks to arrangements made 
for him by the USA and Canada, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled to Zimbabwe on May 21, 
1991. Following the June 1991 U.S.-brokered London peace talks composed of the 
representatives of the Ethiopian Government, the EPLF, the TPLF, and the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), a conference which was chaired by Herman Cohen, who 
advanced the idea of Eritrean independence, units of the TPLF were given the green 
light by the USA Government to enter Addis Ababa.  According to Newsweek:  
  
 Throwing stones and wielding clubs, demonstrators blamed the United 
States for installing new rulers in the capital and supporting the 
separation of Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Red Sea province.  More than 2,000 
people stormed the U.S. Embassy, waving placards and chanting anti-
American slogans.  When the crowd charged a car flying a U.S. flag, 
Tigrean rebels opened fire, killing a demonstrator and wounding several 
others.  At the heart of the Ethiopian rage was the feeling that the U.S. 
was abetting the break-up of their country.  Angry marchers in Addis 
Ababa complained of being cut off from their country’s future.  The real 
bombshell that day came out of London, when Cohen, a 35-year veteran 
of the foreign service, had to jettison original plans and reverse decades 
of U.S. policy by calling a referendum on independence for Eritrea.  
Cohen spoke with Tigrean rebel leader Meles Zenawi (telling him) that 
rebel forces should move on the capital as soon as possible.  Still, U.S. 
involvement in Ethiopia has not exactly been a model of artful 
diplomacy.61 
 
Why the U.S. had to reverse its established policy regarding the maintenance of 
Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, or in whose interest the country was being broken-up, or 
why, as Christopher Clapham put it, “everyone who counts in a deeper sense in Ethiopia 
has been left out of all this,”62 is still quite a mystery.  In fact, Tesfaye Dinka, the 
Ethiopian Prime Minister of the time and delegate to the London talks, who was enraged 
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by the decision, said:  “Residents of Addis Ababa would violently resist any rebel 
advance,” and in protest, he pulled out of the talks.63 
 
Serious errors and misjudgments made by the Western Powers, particularly Germany 
and the USA, helped to ignite the break-up of Yugoslavia. Similar errors of judgment on 
the part of the USA and Britain contributed to the present tragedy in Ethiopia. 
Why were not the Ethiopian people allowed to participate in charting their own destiny?  
Does the rule of law proclaim that Ethiopians should be governed by a different set of 
standards than the rest of the world?  Why were not they allowed to exercise their right 
to self-determination?  Was the “red flag” of the so-called EPLF and TPLF a convenient 
mask designed to deceive the public?  Were the two organizations being rewarded for 
the role they played in destabilizing the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam?  Many 
Ethiopians are now constantly asking such questions.   
 
Eritrea’s Independence 
It was, in this capacity, that the “transitional” government of Ethiopia, exceeding its 
mandate, took measures that continue to endanger the peace and security of the 
Ethiopian state. Among other things, the following is what the regime wrote to the U.N. 
Secretary General:   
 
The future status of Eritrea should be decided in a referendum.  Both the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the Provisional Government of 
Eritrea have registered their commitment to respect the results of the 
referendum.  The Transitional Government of Ethiopia wishes to bring to 
your attention the need to initiate appropriate measures to enable the U.N. 
to play its role and to supervise the referendum.64 
 
By definition, a transitional government can only serve a temporary agenda.  It means 
that it has no mandate to engage itself on questions of a fundamental nature that can 
affect the population on a long-term basis.  Moreover, the United Nations had already 
disposed itself of the Eritrean problem in 1952.  Does it have the mandate to supervise 
again another referendum?  Why is not that done in several other countries and places 
like Puerto Rico, which were disposed of by the U.N. in circumstances similar to that of 
Eritrea?  If the TPLF regime were truly Ethiopian, it would have been guided by 
Ethiopia’s national interest.  What was most astonishing was that, apart from 
independence, the people of Eritrea were not given other choices, including federation, 
confederation, or autonomy, for which the EPLF itself had campaigned for years.  The 
actions taken by the so-called Transitional Government of Ethiopia indicates how much 
influence the EPLF has over the TPLF.  As the one time editor of The Ethiopian 
Commentator, Haile Mariam Abebe pointed out: “Before anything else, the people 
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living in the region called “Eritrea” are, Tigreans.  The idea of “Tigreans” and 
“Eritreans” as separate peoples, was never ours…”65 
 
In 1992, the “transitional government” forcefully annexed seven fertile districts from 
Gondar and Wollo and incorporated them to Tigrai. These districts have never been part 
of Tigrai Province. They include Humera, Tselemt, Wolkait and Tsegede, which 
historically belonged to Gondar. The others are Raya Azebo, Alamata and Ofla, which 
were part of Wollo Province. In order to change the demographic composition of the 
annexed districts, Tigrean refugee returnees from the Sudan and demobilized TPLF 
soldiers were settled in them. The language of instruction in primary schools also 
changed from Amharic to Tigrigna. Eventually, the Amharic speaking natives of the 
districts were forcefully evicted from their lands. They became either cheap farm 
labourers on their own farms, or street beggars in such towns as Gondar, Dessie and 
Bahir Dar. Some joined a peasant armed uprising called "Kefagne," that continues to 
struggle against the regime in power.66  
 
In early January 1993, the TPLF regime brutally suppressed demonstrations which were 
designed to protest the involvement of the U.N. in the Eritrean independence process.  
The demonstrators were challenging the mandate of the so-called TPLF and the EPLF to  
initiate the referendum.  None of them are democratically elected by the people to be 
entrusted with such a responsibility.  Even if the referendum was to be accepted as an 
“expression” of the will of the people, it is still a product of essentially guerrilla 
organizations – unelected and self- appointed at that, on whose initiative much 
depended.  A future democratically elected government of Ethiopia can raise the 
Eritrean question on perfect legal grounds. 
 
Bantustanization 
 
As if its stand on Eritrea was not enough, the regime, which, many Ethiopians describe 
as “mercenary”, came out with its ethnic agenda. No government in the world has 
devolved powers on ethnic basis. Nor has any government explicitly granted its 
constituent parts the legal right to secede. In fact, ethnicity-based parties are banned in 
many countries of the world. Even the leading democratic countries like the USA, 
Britain, France and Sweden, do not carry such provisions in their constitutions. Groups 
which entertain such ideas are considered dangers to public peace and security.  South 
Africa, for instance, has tried to take ethnicity out of politics. But in Ethiopia, ethnicity 
is openly accepted and encouraged, to the extent that the regime insists that it be the 
basis of all political affiliation.67 And this is happening in a country where there are 
millions of Ethiopians who are not even aware to which ethnic group they belong, where 
millions of Ethiopians are products of mixed marriages, and where there are millions 
who have broken down the barriers of ethnicity and evolved into Pan-Ethiopian patriots 
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or nationalists. To which state do these millions belong? The only state they know is 
Ethiopia. The regime used language as the basis of ethnic affiliation and has re-drawn 
the boundaries of administrative regions along language lines.  It created eight ethnic-
based states, with the promise that new ones may be created when necessary.  Here too, 
it should be noted that the setting up of internal administrative boundaries is too 
important a national question to be decided upon by a government that was only 
“transitional”, and without the people’s mandate.  In any event, the new constitution 
couched in the old Soviet terminology, established the so-called Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, comprised of eight ethnically based regions or states, namely:  
Afar, Amhara, Ben-shangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali, Southern Ethiopia 
Peoples and Tigray. Language was the major criteria utilized in drawing up the 
boundaries.  Article 39 of the constitution states:  
 
Every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted 
right to self-determination up to secession; shall have the right to speak, 
write and develop its languages…68 
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THE TPLF CREATED ETHNIC ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS 
  
 
Yet, with the exception of the Afar and Somali regions that are relatively homogeneous, 
all have significant minority ethnic groups. These include Amhara ( Agew, Kimant, 
Felasha, Oromo, Tigrean); Oromia ( Amhara, Gurage, Tigrean, Sidama etc.); Tigrai  
(Amhara, Oromo, Kunama, Erob). In the Southern Nations alone, there are over fifty 
tribal groups. If the TPLF practices what it preaches, it would have allowed the Kunama 
and the Irob of Tigrai Province, as well as the people of Northern and Northwestern 
Gondar and Wollo, whose territories have been forcefully annexed to Tigrai, to exercise 
their right to self-determination.  Likewise, its mentor, the EPLF, could have done the 
same to Afars, the Kunama, the Tigre, the Ben Amir, Bilen and the other nationalities in 
Eritrea.  But more fundamentally, the use of the linguistic criterion, to the virtual 
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exclusion of others is, to say the least, a disaster. In drawing the boundaries little 
attention was given to such fundamental questions as history, geographic size, 
population density, economic and administrative viability, agriculture and resource base, 
level of development of the infrastructure, ability to generate tax revenue, and 
administrative capacity.69  While a consolidated democracy like France or Belgium can 
live with some uncertainty regarding the future boundaries of the state, such uncertainty 
can only be fatal for a country like Ethiopia. Until the coming to power of the current 
regime, Ethiopia used to be one of the few stable countries in the region. However, once 
the regime started to divide the people into ethnic-based enclaves, each purposely pitted 
against the other, tensions among ethnic groups began to increase dramatically over the 
past several years.70  The ill-conceived policy has generated internal violence because 
ethnic majorities in some states have become intolerant towards minority groups in their 
jurisdictions, as has been the case in the Southern Peoples’ Administrative Region and in 
the Somali region of Ethiopia.  Regional-based ethnicity is also a development risk 
because it limits the movement of capital and labour required to take advantage of 
economic opportunities, creates entitlement that can block development, and leads to 
irrational use of energy and other resources71  The farms in Humera and the Awash 
Valley for instance used to provide employment opportunities for 100,000 and 150,000 
workers respectively. The workers came from all over the country. The ethnic policy of 
the present regime discourages labour mobility. It would in fact perpetuate and even 
aggravate regional and ethnic inequality.  The manner with which the TPLF government 
was going about it suggested not so much a genuine desire to address the wishes of the 
various ethnic groups, but to sow and fan discord among them,72 which would greatly 
please Machiavelli. Indeed, what is going on in Ethiopia today is not multiculturalism, 
but a means of promoting divisiveness along cultural lines.  
 
In point of fact, what has been done has led to disputes, often violent ones, among 
various groups over territorial boundaries, often showing the insufficiency of using a 
single criterion such as language to define these boundaries and, sometimes, indicating 
the hegemonic ambitions of the ethnic leaders of some of the groups.  Persons judged to 
belong to the “wrong” ethnic group are being expelled from their lands, robbed of their 
properties, and dismissed from their jobs. The only people who are above such 
persecutions are the members of the ruling elite.   
 
The drawing of ethnic boundaries and the associated fanning of intra-ethnic hatred have 
created the sad situation in which many Ethiopian citizens find themselves.  They are 
made to suffer for no other reason than they happen to speak the “wrong” language.  
Individual citizens who claimed Amharic as the only language that they spoke suddenly 
became suspect, real “threats” to democracy and justice.  Many others who claimed 
mixed ethnic parentage found themselves in the impossible position of having to disown 
one half of their heritage in order to survive TPLF’s ethnic cleansing.  As a result, entire 
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communities, long settled, and in many ways indistinguishable from the local 
community, have been wiped out.   
 
According to Human Rights Watch, the causes of the ethnic disputes are to be found in 
the new ideology of self-determination, which has encouraged an upsurge in ethnic 
nationalism [expressed] in local disputes over land, water, and grazing rights.  The 
displacement of 60,000 Amharic-speaking Muslims from the Diba Tena and Mandura 
Guanga woredas of Gojjam province following an attack by the Beni Shangul ethnic 
group is a case in point.73 The 1995 Conflicts between Gujis and Sidamas ended up with 
the intervention of federal forces. In the 1995 and 1999 Oromo- Somali conflicts, 
numerous people were killed. In 2001, the so-called Oromo-Amhara conflict in Eastern 
Wollega, in reality instigated by the regime, resulted in the death of many lives and in 
the displacement of 12,000 Amharic speaking Ethiopians.  Another case in point is the 
attack on non-Oromos in Arussie in which 60 people were killed, 60 were wounded, 
6205 heads of cattle were looted, 64 houses were destroyed, and crops on 247 hectares 
of land were set on fire, and 3,000 persons of Gurage ethnic background were displaced 
and hundreds of them killed.74  In Arba Gugu region, 320,000 Amharas were displaced 
and hundreds of them killed.  Villagers were burned alive.  Some 150 Christians were 
killed in Arba Gugu and a further 46 were murdered in Harar.75  
  
 
A conflict between the Geri and Jaarso clans displaced 125, 000 people near Jijiga, 
while 45,000 were affected by the fighting between the Yabere and Issaq.  In the far 
south of the country, there has been fighting between the Borana Oromo and the 
Marehan Somali.  Other local ethnic groups, such as the Guji, have also been drawn in.  
The fighting caused tens of thousands of refugees to flee to nearby Kenya.  In the west, 
ethnic Annuak and Nuer have clashed and Amhara settlers have been attacked in 
Wollega.  An unknown number of highlanders were also killed in a Nuer attack on a 
market place.76   
 
For example, in the Oromiya State in 1999, the regional government required that all 
primary schools adopt Oromiffa as the language of instruction.  This drew protests from 
groups that reside there, but whose mother tongue is not Oromiffa and who believed that 
their children would be at a disadvantage. Those who protested, including teachers and 
government workers, have had their employment terminated.  
 
Similarly, in May 1999, local administrators in the Southern Nations and Nationalities 
informed elementary and high school teachers that new textbooks would be used in the 
North Omo zone, which merged four closely related languages spoken in the zone:  
Welayita, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro.  Neither local communities nor teachers had been 
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consulted before the decision was made to introduce the new textbooks.  Subsequently, 
police arrested those teachers who objected to the new language.  The arrests led to 
widespread demonstrations and rioting in the town of Sodo, during which police killed 
ten people, injured hundreds, and arrested and detained as many as 1,000 others.  Most 
of those arrested were released, but some 20 elders, teachers, and civil servants were 
charged with subversion and remained in prison at year’s end because they could not 
make bail of between $6,000 and $12,500 (50,000 and 100,000 birr).  As a result of this 
conflict, Welayita was used as the language of instruction in schools during the year, and 
Welayita became its own zone in November. 
 
 There were also reports of clashes between the Oromo Borana community and ethnic 
Somali Garre pastoralists in the southeast, which reportedly resulted in the death of 
some 40 persons and the theft of hundreds of livestock.  There were reports of a clash 
over grazing and watering rights between the two communities, which reportedly 
resulted in the killing of at least 150 people and injuries to many others.  
 
Let alone political parties, even civic organizations cannot be allowed to function unless 
they are organized on an ethnic basis.  It has become illegal for Ethiopians to register as 
Ethiopians and to vote.  Individuals who identify with Ethiopia, and who insist that they 
can only vote as Ethiopians since they do not belong to any ethnic group, cannot vote.  
The truth is, Pan-Ethiopian nationalism and ethnic nationalism cannot co-exist in the 
same political space for a long time.  The latter does not foster a sense of loyalty to the 
larger political community.77 As an acute observer of the scene notes: Ethnicization has 
literally blurred the distinction between Ethiopian and Tigrean interests.  If you happen 
to be an Amhara, no matter how much you cherish justice and democracy, you cannot 
represent Tigreans.  To assume that all members of an ethnic group, be they peasants, 
workers or capitalists, think alike is not rational.78 
 
As a result of the politicization of ethnicity and the destructive policy of bantustanization 
that the TPLF has introduced in Ethiopian politics, ethnicity is fostering parochial 
relationships.  It is interfering with the development of rational and efficient forms of 
political and economic administration.  Ethnicity is also impeding the optimum 
harnessing of human and non-human resources, and has become a serious barrier to 
factor mobility.79 
 
The creation of ethnic boundaries for the Afars, Somalis, Oromos, Tigreans, Amharas, 
and so on, has ominous implications for the peace and development of not only Ethiopia, 
but also of Eritrea, the Sudan, Dijibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and beyond, where common 
ethnic groups straddle across common borders.  To advance the type of policy on 
ethnicity, as the TPLF has done, is to be totally irresponsible.  Ethiopians cannot make 
economic and social progress in the absence of basic security.  Security in turn is 
threatened by a policy promoted by a regime that gambles in calculated chaos, and that 
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is not accountable to logic, fair play, or sense of decency. Whatever happens to Ethiopia 
is not going to take place in a sealed territorial container.  It will take others down with 
it.  
The explanation provided by the regime’s critics is that the TPLF’s obsession with the 
politics of ethnicity and its determination to alter the structure of the state is designed in 
such a way that nothing remains of what they perceive as the domination of the Amhara 
over the rest. Every policy or lack of policy is measured in terms of its impact on the 
perceived level of Amhara representation in state bodies, institutions of learning and 
cultural fora.80 But it would be more accurate to say that the ethnic policy of the regime 
has been created to keep the TPLF in power. The Machiavellian trick of divide and rule 
was not born yesterday.  It might have also been designed so that if the scheme failed, 
the TPLF would secede from Ethiopia and establish an independent Tigrai state.  It 
might also have been conceived to safeguard Eritrea’s independence by weakening 
Ethiopian nationalism. Nevertheless, and to that end, the differences between the various 
ethnic groups are highlighted, while values, experiences, principles and goals that they 
share in common are played down. Instead of capitalizing on what the people of 
Ethiopia have in common and building on that, as most scholars who have studied the 
country have recommended, the TPLF regime has found it convenient to emphasize their 
differences, to sponsor the independence of Eritrea, and to contain the country’s 
diversity through ethnic confederations, rather than through the integration of all people 
into a united Ethiopia.   
 
Dr. Beyene Petros, Chairman of the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and 
Democracy in Ethiopia, characterized the system of rule of the present regime as 
vindictive, and cited examples which included the disbanding of the armed forces and 
police of the country, the mass lay-offs of skilled workers on the basis of their ethnic and 
political affiliations, the discriminatory land redistribution in the rural areas, and the 
harassment and detention of the members and leaders of opposition groups and trade 
unions.81 
 
The TPLF is also labeled as an organization dominated by Eritreans, and working in the 
interest of Eritrea. It is strongly alleged by many Ethiopians that in the 1990s, the EPLF 
set up a clandestine parallel government in Ethiopia whose sole purpose was looting. It 
was heavily involved in contrabands, money laundering, extortion, tax collection, 
kidnapping and other illegal activities. In fact, it is widely claimed that the idea of  
internal “tribal” restructuring of Ethiopia came from the EPLF leaders. Although Eritrea 
is a microcosm of Ethiopia because all the ethnic groups that inhabit Eritrea are 
extensions of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the EPLF leadership has gone on record to 
declare that the Ethiopian system is not suitable for Eritrea. As The Economist put it: 
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The rulers of Eritrea have no intention of permitting political parties that are based on 
ethnicity to function in Eritrea.82 
The EPLF leadership which is facing serious opposition because of its dictatorial policy, 
but which claimed to have been fighting for Eritrean independence because Haile 
Selassie’s government had banned political parties, and suppressed independent 
newspapers, has not done any better.  There are no political parties in today’s Eritrea 
except the ruling party. In fact, the EPLF has gone on record and declared:   
 
Political parties in Eritrea will not be allowed to have any ethnic, regional or           
religious basis. Basing politics on ethnic, clan, and nationality lines definitely 
has its negative implications.  It will lead to more friction and it might lead to 
some kind of disunity.  It would be difficult to govern a country that is 
organized along ethnic and nationality lines.83 
 
 Unless guided by sinister motives, why then recommend it to Ethiopia? It is 
the same EPLF leadership which was given the green light at the London 
Conference in 1991 to take over Eritrea. It is also the same EPLF from whom 
the 15-Member European Union is forced to withdraw all of its ambassadors in 
Asmara. While the act could be considered commendable, why limit it to the 
EPLF? Why not extend it to the TPLF? One without the other is only half 
necessary. Besides, what is the difference between pepsi cola and coca cola? 
                                           Education 
 While it has been asserted that any thought can be expressed in any language, it is well 
to recognize that the majority of the languages in the world probably do not possess 
vocabularies adequate for higher and especially technical education.  For example, in the 
early 1960s, the West African state of Guinea, had tried to do what the present regime in 
Ethiopia is doing today.  Guinea conceived the use of six local languages, including 
Malinke and Sossou.  However, at the end of the day, it could only appeal to French as a 
unifying factor and abandoned the whole scheme.   
 
It can hardly be denied that a major proportion of positions open to educated persons in 
countries like Ethiopia require precisely that sort of information transmitted by complex 
technical vocabularies.  The TPLF authorities that have proclaimed that education 
should be provided in the various languages of the country should have taken account of 
this fact.  Despite suggestions that a child is more comfortable if first introduced to 
school in the native language, recognition must be given to the difficulties implied in the 
assumption that each child be educated fully in the mother tongue.  Creating different 
educational institutions for each language group, and providing educational materials in 
all the vernaculars, is too expensive and inefficient in the light of the demands made on 
the individual in the adult world.  On top of that, many Ethiopian languages like for 
instance the languages spoken in Abobo and Godere districts of Gambella, lack-writing 
systems.  Many are not readily useable for typewriters, typesetting machines or the 
computer.  They lack adequate technical vocabulary for teaching such subjects as 
physics and chemistry.  Responsible leadership cannot side step these problems.  Can 
Ethiopia, one of the least developed countries of the world, provide education from 
elementary to the university level in so many languages?  Even the U.S., the richest 
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country in the world that has had a democratic system for more than 200 years, and 
where there are some 327 different languages, has not attempted to provide public 
education in any language other than in English. 
 
Susan Hoben of Boston University, who spent some time in Ethiopia studying the 
educational system, says:  During the literacy campaign of the 1970s, the military 
regime designated fifteen languages for use, encompassing the mother tongues of 90% 
of the population.  While the military regime used a non-formal vehicle not meant to be 
a permanent part of the educational system, the present regime is promoting their use in 
the formal, permanent school system.  The Dergue used the Ethiopic script exclusively 
for all languages.  Now the Latin alphabet is being used for non-Semitic ones. The 
military regime had brought down the rate of illiteracy in the country from 94% in 1974 
to 63% in 1984. But since the present regime came to power, the literacy campaign has 
been brought to a halt. 84 
Hoben further points out that in a large town like Jimma, there were streams for 
Amharic-medium and Oromo-medium instructions.  On the other hand, in Natri, a 
hamlet on the road to Jimma, the school had received Oromo materials, though the local 
populace was Gurage, Amhara, Hadiya and Janjero.  At this school, enrollment had 
plummeted, going form 357 students in 1991 to 281 in 1992 and to 133 at the start of 
1993.  In other schools, students showed us their brand new Latin script books with 
some consternation.  “We have been studying in Amharic up to now, and all of a sudden, 
they expect us to use these,”85 they complained. 
 
Many Ethiopians were also upset that instead of schools teaching in their language or in 
Amharic, which would have been most useful, their children were suddenly being asked 
to learn in a regional language that was not theirs and that they might not even speak.  
Their only recourse in the short run was to vote with their feet.  At the same time, 
teachers who came from other parts of the country, and who could not speak the local 
language adequately, were being dismissed.  In fact, in September 1995, the regime’s 
party paper, Abiotawi Democracy, reported that 300,000 students had not been 
registered in schools throughout what is called Oromia, because 6,000 of their teachers 
did not speak or understand the Oromo language.86 The Ado Shakiso School in Borana 
had 340 students.  Of these, only 30 are ethnic Oromos.  In spite of this, the Oromo 
language has been imposed as a language of instruction on 98% of the Amharic- 
speaking students.  Mesfin Bedada, the director of the school, himself an Oromo, 
confessed that the students are not learning because they are unable to understand 
instructions in the new medium, and so they have left school.87As if that was not 
enough, the regime does not allow newspapers and other publications originating from 
Addis Ababa to be distributed in the regions.88 According to Marina Ottaway, the 
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restructuring of Ethiopia along ethnic lines was an obstacle to democratization and 
human rights in other ways as well.  The independent press, for example, found it 
increasingly difficult to distribute publications outside the capital city.  The reason, the 
government explained, was that each nationality had the right to its own language, which 
would be violated by the distribution of Amharic-language publications in regions where 
the mother language was different.  Language rights were twisted into a repressive 
instrument to limit freedom of speech and information.89 
 
In spite of trumpet blast, and contrary to what is being claimed, 72% of school-age 
children do not have access to formal education in Ethiopia, and just 15% of eligible 
students attend secondary schools.90 
 
The dismissal of 42 university professors from their faculty positions, for no other 
reason than they happen to belong to different ethnic groups than those in power, the 
prevention of the teaching of Amharic in many parts of the country, including in the 
Amharic-speaking regions of Gondar and Wollo which were forcefully annexed to 
Tigrai, the drop in the number of students attending schools in Ethiopia in excess of one 
million since the TPLF came to power, constitutes the track record of the regime.  In 
contrast, the regime has built in Tigrai an impressive number of schools and colleges, 
including the introduction of computers at all school levels.  
 
But as far as literacy goes, where alphabetization ends, proper schooling begins. If the 
relevant literature that can sustain interest in education is not provided, people generally 
go back to sleep again. Reading material on agriculture, public health, marketing, 
history, geography, and the like, which in some measure can bring betterment of their 
material conditions is crucial. The recommendations of the 1972 Education Sector 
Review are still valid. That the educational system be Ethiopianized to help in blending 
indigenous cultures into the rich national culture, that national consciousness be 
strengthened by cultivating values that are appreciative of religious and cultural 
diversity, and that the teaching of Amharic as a medium of instruction at the various 
levels be carried out, without suppressing vernaculars for initial exposure to education, 
and as an important task that is fundamental to national integration.91     
Human Rights 
Ephraim Haile expresses the feelings of many Ethiopians when he says: The lack of 
concern for the common good; the violation of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity; the 
sacrifice of the national interest; the wide-spread violations of human rights, including 
extensive torture, disappearances and assassinations; the trimming of the civil service by 
one fourth, in which the most experienced and qualified civil servants were fired for 
political and ethnic reasons; the repeatedly rigged and fraudulent elections; the 
imprisonment of human rights activists, leaders of political parties, educators, newspaper 
editors and reporters; the banning of the trade unions, teachers associations, and student 
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organizations; the massacre of religious worshippers and more, constitutes the track 
record of the most  sinister traitors in all of Ethiopian history.92 
 
In this regard, the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists 
reported: 
…Opposition to basic government policies is not permitted.  Opponents 
who have been in exile are categorized as war-mongers and any 
representative who dares to return to Ethiopia does so at his jeopardy.  The 
facts do suggest that the government’s commitment to human rights and 
democratic values is more rhetorical than real.  The rhetoric is useful to 
tranquilize donor governments, with respect to the continuing signs of 
abuse of power, but the substance of the declared human rights is available 
only to those who support the government’s policies.93 
 
Similarly, the Solidarity Committee for American Political Prisoners, among other 
things, reported: “In Ethiopia killings by the official security men and the government 
are on the rise, and that the number of prisoners is increasing.” Some sources claim that 
there are some 24,000 political prisoners in the state called Oromia and another 40,000 
in Tigrai.94 In fact, from 1992 - 2,000 over 10,000 government opponents were detained 
without charge.  Today the figure is said to have doubled.   Likewise, the constant 
harassment of independent-minded journalists, extra-judicial killings, political 
imprisonment, involuntary disappearances, torture and detention without charge, ran 
rampant as documented by Amnesty International.  By using the so-called “Structural 
Adjustment” Programme as a convenient cover for ethnic cleansing, the regime has also 
systematically dismissed non-Tigrean Ethiopians from their jobs.  These include, 10,000 
school teachers, 10,061 employees of the Ethiopian Building Construction Authority, 
3,400 employees of the Rental Housing Authority, 56,000 civil servants, 300,000 
members of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, and so on.95 On March 21, 1997, some 200-
university students who were protesting against government land policy were also 
arrested.  In violation of the provisions of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
many of the students were tortured. 
 
Similarly, the police attack of April 2001 on Addis Ababa University’s largest campus 
left 41 students and other protesters dead and 250 injured.  About 2,500 were also 
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arrested.  Ethnic politics has polarized teaching at the university to an extent that it has 
lost its original mission of charting the country’s development strategy.96 
 
The Economy 
The TPLF Leaders had claimed that they took power in order to eradicate poverty from 
the face of Ethiopia. But ten years after their coming to power, Ethiopians remain 
amongst the world’s poor, with more than half of the population below internationally 
recognized poverty levels, and dependent on foreign aid every year to combat famine. 
The only ones from whom poverty has been eradicated are the influential members of 
the leadership, their families and their friends. The average Ethiopian is poorer today, 
than he was thirty years ago. 
 
 The government owns the land. Almost 40% of farm households have less than 0.5 
hectares of land, and more than 60% have less than 1 hectare from which to support a 
family of six or eight people. They now also pay more for fertilizers and other inputs, 
while receiving lower prices for their crops.97 If farming is not transformed, there cannot 
be a genuine economic development. If agricultural production increases, the population 
can be fed adequately. The surplus can be transferred to other sectors.  The farmer can 
still be better off than he was. Prosperity will also enable him to provide a growing 
market for manufactured goods. In this respect, the excess labour force in the 
overcrowded highlands could be settled in the south, west and east of the country where 
the land: man ratio is favourable. Holdings could also be enlarged and private ownership 
encouraged. Land distribution is not simply a matter of egalite judiciaire, but of rescuing 
the peasant from the domination of the state. It is the central pillar of the structure of 
social privilege. However, given the existing system of ethnic enclaves, neither the 
enlargement of the farms nor the resettlement of farmers elsewhere is feasible. The 
regime is in power to provide land to its supporters and to take away land from those 
who oppose its ethnic policy. 
  
The constitution of 1994 prohibits political organizations from engaging in profit-
making activities. Yet, many of the influential members of the TPLF are engaged in 
monetary scandals and fraudulent practices. They have established business enterprises 
which include manufacturing industries, banks and insurance, and whose assets are 
estimated between 1 billion and 2 billion birr. Other sources claim that the TPLF has 
created a business empire worth 3.3 billion birr. For example, out of government 
controlled 44 companies that run 3.5 billion birr, the TPLF owns 32 of them. Most of 
these companies were state owned, but they were sold by the Privatization Agency to the 
TPLF below their market price.98  Some 200 state-owned enterprises have also been sold 
at a cost of $357 million, no doubt, again, below the market price, the buyer and seller in 
all this being the TPLF.  Another 110 state-owned enterprises are to be sold soon.99 
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Since there is no accountability, in the midst of mass poverty, instant millionaires have 
emerged. Mismanagement, inefficiency, greed, non-payment of taxes, resale of products 
in the domestic market which were intended for export, and more, have all become the 
order of the day. The authorities have never presented reports of their accounts. They 
have never been audited. In fact, TPLF businesses and government businesses have 
never been separated, just as in Eritrea. It is claimed that TPLF business firms have 
preferential treatment over private-sector companies with respect to government 
contracts, custom clearances, government controlled credit facilities, and export and 
import licenses.100 There is also the official policy of ethnic bias which prompts the 
leaders to allocate disproportional amounts of public resources to the favoured region – 
Tigrai.101 Billions of dollars raised from the international community through loans and 
aid grants for Ethiopia have been diverted for the exclusive development of Tigrai. 
These include highways, airports, factories, telecommunication networks, dams, 
electrification of towns, hospitals, and so on. But the question is: What about the other 
regions of the country?   
 
Ethiopia has received over  $7 billion in grants and loans in the last ten years. Yet, the 
cumulative investment capital of the 200 approved projects (1993-1999) was U.S.$1.1 
billion. However, only 21 projects with an investment capital of U.S.$400 are currently 
in operation.102 So what happened to the rest of the funds? The country’s average annual 
population increase has reached 3%.  The implication of this is that in order to meet 
domestic demand, food production has to increase by at least 6.5%.  Inflation stood at an 
average annual rate of 15%, pushing basic food staffs beyond the reach of the poor.  
Because of the very small tax base and the widespread poverty, most of the newly 
created ethnic regions cannot raise their own revenue.  As a result, they have started 
setting up roadblocks to collect excise duties.  The deficit which grew from 7.1% of 
GDP in 1993 to 10.2% in 1994, increased to 16.9% in 1995, and has continued since 
then. The current $642 million deficit is expected to be covered through external 
funding. As of 1992, the birr has also been devalued by 147.8%, making the country’s 
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exports correspondingly cheap. The challenge is to raise the investment rate from 18% 
to at least 25% of the GDP.103 But without carrying out the necessary reforms regarding 
public administration, land use, taxation, banking, infrastructure, accumulation, and so 
on, it will be an impossible task. Confiscation, inflation, forced saving, government 
bonds, foreign aid, foreign investment, and the creation of export of industrial and 
agricultural products are all means of saving. The curtailment of luxury spending by the 
privileged ruling elite can also help in the accumulation of capital. At some point, the 
savings made will result in more consumption later. But at the beginning, there is no 
other way except tightening ones belt. When savings is expanded, productivity can also 
increase. When the surplus is re-invested, further expansion is made possible. All this 
requires exceptional leadership that has insight and vision, as well as considerable 
education and administrative skills. Developing a democratic system that is genuinely 
pluralistic, discouraging ethnic politics that is by definition divisive, investing in people, 
effective regulation in key sectors of the economy, accountably in public-sector 
management, diversification of the economy, promoting private-sector activity and 
improving economic management could galvanize economic performance. But the 
TPLF is ill-equipped and ill-prepared to do all this. There is nothing in its background 
that has prepared it for this type of responsibility. 
 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are providing assistance. 
But it is contingent upon austere structural adjustment programmes that include 
wholesale privatization, removal of trade barriers, diminished protection for national 
industries, reduced corporate taxes, elimination of state subsidies on food, fuel, 
education, health and transport, devaluation of currency, and the scaling back of bloated 
bureaucracies.104 
 
No doubt, the World Bank and the IMF promote a market-oriented approach to 
economic management that rests on the assumption that economic “rationality” is 
constant across all societies, regardless of the level of development of any country. It is 
also argued that controlling budget deficits and money supplies, and liberalizing the 
foreign exchange regime, which, in turn, would ensure that the market was given 
freedom to allocate resources within the economy, would rectify the distortions created 
by undue and inefficient state intervention in economic management.105  However, this 
is contrary to the historical experience of the now industrialized countries.  
 
Some of the World Bank/IMF prescriptions include the following: shrinkage of 
government bureaucracies, deregulation of the economy, removal of government 
involvement from economic activities, cut-backs in government expenditures, especially 
in social spending and subsidies, introducing user fees in education and health care, 
increasing food prices, cutbacks in or containment of wages, privatization of state-
owned enterprises, devaluation of the currency, elimination of or reduction in protection 
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for the domestic market, fewer restrictions on the operations of foreign investors, and so 
on.106 
 
As a result, state enterprises are passing into private hands, protectionist barriers on 
imports are being eliminated, restrictions on foreign investment are lifted, and export-
first policies are implemented with quasi-religious zeal.  Since the government is forced 
to reorient the economy towards exports in order to earn the foreign exchange required 
for servicing the national debt, Ethiopia has become correspondingly more dependent on 
the global economy.  In the process, the power of the government to provide necessities 
to the population is being reduced. 107 
 
There is also the problem of privatization. The debate on privatization    has been 
stimulated by the budget maximization thesis because of the alleged ‘inefficiency’ of 
public enterprises, which need constant state subsidy. However, it is a reflection of the 
shift in values among governments in Western Europe.  It has now been extended to 
Africa and elsewhere as part of the general spread of ideas and policy conditions 
attached to assistance.  But if one studies the economic history of some of the 
technologically advanced countries, one can see that governments set in motion all the 
major industrial projects of the first break-through, and that national development 
requires not just a state, but a strong state.   In fact, the less developed, the greater the 
need for strong state intervention. The powerful role played by states in the economic 
transformation of the countries of Southeast Asia can be mentioned to illustrate the 
point.  
 
The assumption that public enterprises are “inefficient” is also dubious. In many ways, 
one cannot ignore the interest of foreign capital in preaching this self-serving ritual, 
which is likely to increase damaging inequalities.  This thesis advances the interests of 
central and policy-level officials at the expense of jobs, worsens the conditions of rank 
and file state employees, and reduces the services the state should provide to the masses. 
To claim that public enterprises are “inefficient” when compared to private enterprises is 
not supported by empirical evidence. When an industry is privatized, the managers and 
the workers are the same as those who managed the old public firm the day before.  
Thus, any change that may occur is not because of the structure of ownership, or the 
character and abilities of management, but of constraints in which the firm operates. 
Moreover, public enterprises and services have public duties and are not meant as 
merely profit-making instruments. It would be inappropriate to judge the performance of 
an enterprise by the simple test of the market because society’s needs are too complex to 
be reduced to that criterion.  Competition between the private and the state sector could 
determine efficiency. Nevertheless, instead of state assets being sold to investors, it 
would have been much better if shares could be given to citizens.108 
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However, many countries like Ethiopia have been subjected to structural adjustment 
programmes. Governments are being forced to cut spending on social services in order 
to save money, which can then be used to repay external debts.  Faced with the threat of 
a cut-off of external funds needed to service the mounting debts, countries like Ethiopia   
have no choice but to implement the painful measures.  But at the end of the day, these 
countries like Ethiopia have not been transformed. The prescriptions have brought 
neither growth nor development. Ethiopia still remains mired in poverty, social 
dislocation, unemployment, malnutrition, homelessness, diseases, and environmental 
degradation. One may even argue that in theory reducing the size of the government 
would open up opportunities for alternative employment opportunities. But there is no 
guarantee that a robust private sector will automatically be created to fill the gaps. In the 
meantime the people suffer. 
Will it Work? 
 
While the architects of the system that prevails in today’s Ethiopia see it as a creative 
and innovative solution to the country’s developmental problems, others maintain that it 
is reactionary and anachronistic. They argue that it is a system whose days are 
numbered. They say that since it refuses to bend in the face of changed reality, it cannot 
hope to survive very long.  And actions based on it, cannot hope to be successful even in 
the long run. The TPLF, they say, has survived so far not on account of its legitimacy, 
but because of the weakness of the opposition. Let alone Ethiopia, it cannot even 
administer the Province of Tigrai. Its critics are in favour of dismantling it, and replacing 
it with a unifying Pan-Ethiopian nationalism that transcends ethnicity. The more so, 
Ethiopians have no prior experience of government by ethnicity. Since political 
legitimacy must be based on a broad constituency, a single ethnic group cannot govern 
in a multi-ethnic country. Ethnicity may be a viable organizing force for an ethnic 
guerrilla movement like the TPLF, but hardly for a political party that hopes to govern a 
muti-ethnic state. If history were a guide, successful governments concentrate on 
national issues which cross ethnic, religious, and provincial boundaries and aggregate 
support based on common concerns.109 
 
Nevertheless, can meaningful devolution be delivered in time to offset the potential 
anarchy embedded in an ethnic-based federal system with a weak centre? Many 
observers say that it probably cannot.110 Some have already concluded that what the 
regime is engaged in is a frightening experiment111Others argue that no one can be sure 
whether the experiment with ethnicity will work.  Meles Zenawi himself has said that he 
does not know if it will work.112  Whatever it achieves in the long run, ethnicity is 
making economic, social and political life difficult now.  It is testing an administrative 
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structure already weakened by years of war and an economy battered by periodic 
drought.  While bitterly resenting Western support to the regime, opposition groups in 
general dismiss the whole notion of devolution and democracy as prescribed by the 
regime as a sham.  All these tendencies point to a dangerous trend, which is pushing the 
1Ethiopian people on the same fatal political course witnessed in the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
 
Wendy Belcher of the Pacific Network News, who was in Ethiopia, has the following to 
say:  “After years of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia’s experiment is in real jeopardy.  Rather 
than helping Ethiopia’s smaller groups to feel more secure, it threatens to balkanize the 
country113 It has not been easy setting up even permanently based administrative 
structures in territories whose inhabitants are largely nomadic herders.  These include 
Somali, Afar, Gambella, and Ben Shangul Gumuz provinces. 
 
 The truth is, there is no congruence between “national self-determination” and 
democratic and accountable government.  The art of politics lies in maintaining levels of 
integration and cooperation as high as could be made compatible with the consent of the 
governed, and in reaching agreement on the optimal locus of decisions in making for 
particular areas of policy.  
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ETHIOPIA’S PROVINCES 1952 – 1980 
 
The frightening experiment has failed because of the following reasons: 
 
First, the very boundaries that were supposed to solve “ethnic problems” are in dispute 
everywhere .The Amharas, Tigreans, Gurages, Somalis, Sidama and the Southern 
People’s for instance, do not accept “Oramia”, or the land claimed by the Oromo 
Liberation Front. In so far as the Oromos have the right to live anywhere in Ethiopia, the 
right of other Ethiopians to live even in provinces where the Oromos constitute a 
majority will have to be recognized and accepted as a matter of principle. Otherwise, the 
situation could go out of hand. In the same way, the people of Gondar and Wollo, whose 
territories have been illegally and forcefully annexed and incorporated to Tigrai, have 
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refused to recognize the present boundaries of Tigrai. Tigreans as well as all other 
Ethiopians can still go and work on the farms as they used to.  Hence, those districts will 
have to revert back to Wollo and Gondar. Secondly, the act of sharing regional 
boundaries based on the main ethnic groups has created minority ethnic groups in each 
region, which are being condemned to the status of permanent minorities without any 
hope of being able to obtain political power.  There are 23 ethnic groups in six of the 
regional states that do not have a sufficient population to qualify for constituency seats. 
Third, though legally sanctioned, ethnic parties have not been willing to work together. 
They tend to be arrogant and neglect the welfare of the minorities whose political 
support they do not need and advocate only the concerns of their constituencies, 
regardless of the consequences upon the national interest.  A good example would be the 
refusal of the Oramia regional government to accept the application of the All Amhara 
Peoples’s Organization to open branch offices in the region.  Fourth, such a system will 
always be unstable because political parties will have to be organized along ethnic lines.  
Moreover, for a federal system to work effectively, the constituent state provinces 
should be of equal size.  What sort of equality is there between Oromia and the Afar, or 
between Ben Shangul and the Amhara state?  
Fifth, reliance on ethnicity as the boundary of political parties has proved to be a disaster 
as an electoral struggle elsewhere.  In fact, without an opposition which both aggregates 
societal interests and represents them in elections, the country cannot move from a 
political opening to a viable form of multi-party democracy.114 
 
There is also the question of resources. Time and space does not permit a detailed 
examination of this subject. But to illustrate the point, let us look at some of the regions.  
For reasons given earlier, the Oromos inhabit that part of the country, which is rich and 
fertile. It produces much of Ethiopia’s industrial raw materials, livestock products, 
timber, cash crops such as tea and coffee, and minerals that include gold and platinum. 
Similarly, the Afars inhabit an area that is rich in geo-thermal energy, which is a cheap 
source of electricity. It also has an estimated 200 million tons of potash. Because of the 
construction of a series of muti-purpose dams on the Awash River in the 1960s, the area 
now produces cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, and various fruits and vegetables. In the same 
way, the Ogaden has proven natural gas and oil deposits. And if a series of multi-
purpose dams were to be built on the Wabi Shibele and Juba Rivers, the area would 
produce a variety of cash crops and industrial raw materials. Southern Ethiopia too, is 
richly endowed. But the present boundary set-up puts the Amharas, the second largest 
population in the country, at a disadvantage. Thousands of them have been killed in the 
last ten years in other regions where they lived for centuries because of the hostile policy 
initiated against them by the existing regime. Thousands of them have also been 
uprooted from their lands for precisely the same reason. The area they inhabit, which the 
regime calls the “Amhara Region”, has been farmed for centuries without interruption. 
Since it is overpopulated, the land: man ratio is not favourable. In so far as current 
information goes, it does not also seem to be blessed with known mineral deposits that 
are commercially exploitable. Even the few commercial farms, which existed in the 
Amhara Provinces like Gondar and Wollo have been forcefully annexed and 
incorporated to Tigrai. If the peace and stability of the country is not to be disturbed, 
these facts should be seriously taken into consideration. 
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To go back to the early point of discussion, in a country like the USA, national unity has 
been attained among people of the most disparate origins, and that differences of 
religion, of culture, and of tradition have not been insurmountable obstacles to the 
coming together of people.  While the authorities in the USA talk of “The American 
People”, and of “One Nation, Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all”, the 
authorities in Addis Ababa and leaders of ethnic parties who have their own sinister 
political agendas insist on “The Peoples of Ethiopia”. Yet, the people of Ethiopia are 
more similar and historically more connected than the different people that inhabit the 
USA.  Since Ethiopians have been interacting with one another for centuries, their 
national identification has been largely formed, and they enjoy widely shared values and 
internalize restrains on highly parochial and norm-challenging actions. 
 
Towards a Working Federation 
 
A federation can be defined as a political unit on which a number of smaller political 
units develop certain power over themselves and their citizens to which they entrust the 
conduct of such affairs as national defense, foreign affairs, foreign trade, economic 
development, transport and communications, public health, and education.  Individual 
provinces retain some control over their internal affairs, and in order that their rights 
should be clearly defined, there is usually a federal constitution, which allocates powers 
between them and the federal government.   The gradual transfer of administrative duties 
to the centre provides for centralization, whereas the sharing of these duties between the 
centre and the periphery maintains the guarantee of survival.115  As disputes often arise 
as to the constitutional legality of executive decisions or laws made by the federal 
government, a supreme court is generally created to interpret the constitution. 
 
Among the elements that contribute to the smooth functioning of such a system are that 
the constituent parts in a federal system must be fairly equal in population and wealth, or 
else balanced geographically or numerically in their inequabilities.  The lack of balance 
among the constituent parts has often resulted in the failure of the federal system.  
Successful federal systems have also been characterized by the permanence of their 
internal boundaries.  Boundary changes may occur, but such changes are made only with 
the consent of the polities involved and are avoided except in extreme situations. 116 
In the case of Ethiopia, one is recommending the federal system for the following 
reasons: 
 
First, the system can be used as a means of uniting further the people who 
are already linked by bonds of history, culture, and nationality through the 
redistribution of political power among the constituent provinces.  In this 
case, the provinces that constitute the federal system are unalterably parts 
of the national whole.  Federalism invariably leads to the development of a 
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strong national government operating in direct contact with the people it 
serves.117 
Second, it allows for local initiative. 
 
Third, federalism is being recommended as a form of decentralized 
government in an established state as a repository of all powers not 
especially granted in order to speed-up the development of the provinces.  
This includes the possession of substantial powers, which can be enforced 
even against the principal local units, which will not be free to nullify the 
laws of the central government or to withdraw from the federal unit. 
 
Fourth, within the framework of centralization of the state, there has 
always been a more loosely federated Ethiopian state. In fact, as noted by 
a keen observer, Ethiopia’s geography predisposed it towards regionalism. 
Yet, thanks to the manner in which the rulers expanded their authority, 
including the spread of their language and religion, Ethiopia has evolved 
into a large unified polity. 118  Hence, the need for partial indulgence into 
decentralization and using it to build consent for centralization, as has 
been the essence of nation building in many states. 
 
Fifth, given its geographic location, its historical, cultural, and economic 
links with the countries of the Horn of Africa, and its potential resource 
endowments, Ethiopia can play an important role in the peace and 
development of the sub-region.  Phase I should focus on the establishment 
of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia.  An open-ended and a working 
federal structure should make it possible for Eritrea to join the federation. 
Phase  II involves Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia. One would suggest 
cooperation with these countries on a number of socio-economic projects 
that could lay down the foundations that would lead to a confederation and 
eventually to the establishment of the Federation of Northeast African 
States. Such projects would include the construction of muti-purpose dams 
on the Awash, the Juba, and the Wabi Shibelle rivers, and cooperation in 
the exploitation of the oil and natural gas deposits in Eastern Ethiopia. To 
that end, the necessary roads and infrastructure could be built to encourage 
trade between these countries. Ethiopia can, for instance, export hydro-
electricity to all of its neighbours. It could also conduct 10% of its export - 
import trade through Port Sudan; 5% through Massawa; 35% through   
Assab; 30% through Djibouti; 10% through Berbera; and 10% through 
Mogadisho.  
 
Most of the Ethiopian opposition movements seem to favour political pluralism.  But the 
proof of the pudding as they say is in the eating.  Federalism can exist only when there is 
considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through 
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conciliation.  Tolerance, fair play, and respecting the equality of rights of other people, 
including their views, are the abiding principles of true federalists.   
 
Given the above factors, the dismantling of the anachronistic ethnic federal structure and 
its replacement by a workable federal structure appears to be important. The local 
potentates and entrenched ethnic oligarchs will resist, but to no avail. The federal idea 
can be implemented by restructuring the state along internal regional administrative 
boundaries that have evolved historically and have received legitimacy by the passage of 
time. The old provinces of Arussie, Bale, Gojjam, Gomu Goffa, Gondar, Harar, 
Illubabor, Keffa, Shoa, Sidamo, Tigrai, Wollega and Wollo have strong historical 
legitimacy. Furthermore, given some modification, the existing Afar and Somali regions, 
could be retained as provinces. In this case, the members of the federation will be fifteen 
provinces. 
In point of fact, the provincial boundaries were not created in an arbitrary manner. They 
were conceived in such a way in order to create what the Germans call “lebensraum” -- 
living space. In most cases, rivers like the Mereb, the Tekezie, the Abai, Awash, and so 
on, served as natural boundaries. Moreover, the highlands and the lowlands, which 
complement each other, were brought together in a common provincial market. One 
could look at the boundaries of such provinces as Wollo, Gondar, Shoa, Bale,Gojjam, 
Wollega, or even Harar. Such an integrated common provincial market in turn created 
conditions where highland and lowland products are exchanged. They also served to 
integrate cultures. So why dismantle the boundaries which provide economic links, and 
which have strong historical legitimacy, and with which millions of Ethiopians identify? 
 
A federal system by definition is costly. But for a vast country like Ethiopia, it is the best 
system. Some of the provinces will need subsidy from the federal government for a 
while. Given political stability, which will provide the opportunity to exploit Ethiopia’s 
immense resources, it will pay in the long run. A federal constitution which corresponds 
to Ethiopia’s historical experiences, but modified to suit its present conditions, and 
based on such principles as the rule of law, state secularism, a bill of rights, a system of 
checks and balances, political and economic pluralism, including the legalization of 
political parties that are organized on the basis of shared political principles and 
philosophies and not merely on ethnic identities, should therefore be presented to the 
Ethiopian people.  A two-chamber federal parliament consisting of a Senate and a 
Chamber of Deputies could be envisioned. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies could 
take place every four years, and for the Senate every six years. Political parties that have 
concrete political programmes to help promote the peace, security and prosperity of the 
people should be given free access into the state-owned mass media to reach the masses. 
Such parties could be conservatives, liberals, socialists, social democrats, Marxists, and 
so on. The point is the playing field would have to be leveled. They should be 
encouraged to compete in the market place of ideas, and to struggle for the hearts and 
minds of the Ethiopian people. The leading party, which commands the highest vote, 
could select the head of state as well as head of government.  
 
As we have seen, the present political system in Ethiopia is creating political instability 
and ethnic strife, which, unless timely measures are taken, could lead to the eventual 
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dismemberment of the country. Without peace and stability, economic development will 
be an impossible task. The people of Ethiopia will be mired in poverty for generations to 
come. The alternative approach to national development that is provided in this study 
will ensure political stability. It will reduce ethnic strife and enhance national unity, as 
well as inflows of foreign capital investment. The result will be a peaceful, unified, free, 
and democratic Ethiopia that will be in a much better position to conquer poverty and 
technical backwardness, and which could also shoulder some regional responsibility for 
peace and development. 
 
 
 
Endnotes:  
